March 31, 1964
Danilo Araujo Marques
Around 5 a.m. that Tuesday morning, the Army's Chief of Staff, General Humberto Castello Branco, received a phone call at his home on rua Nascimento Silva, in Ipanema. On the other end of the line, federal deputy Armando Falcão, of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), reported that troops led by General Olympio Mourão Filho – commander of the 4th Military Region and the 4th Infantry Division of the I Army – were heading down from Juiz de Fora toward Rio de Janeiro. A word to the wise is enough: the military uprising to overthrow Jango – meticulously conspired and stitched together over months – had just been run over.
But, while Castello Branco was receiving the news, the scenario on the other side of the border with Minas Gerais had not yet changed all that much. Although 4,000 soldiers had been on standby since 6:40 a.m., they all remained duly stationed. Thanks to the bravado of general Mourão, the propaganda had arrived long before the product. Thirsty for the spotlight, the self-appointed "Commander of the Forces in Operations for the Defense of Democracy" had sent radio stations and newspaper newsrooms a "Manifesto to the Nation and the Armed Forces," in which he declared himself in rebellion against the legality then in force.
The Armed Forces high command didn't usually put much faith in Mourão's words – if only because his plan to take over Guanabara wasn't exactly new. This time, however, the Minas Gerais-born military man was determined to take the reins of the situation and set the Tiradentes Detachment marching down the União e Indústria road, headed for Guanabara. The
Jornal do Brasil
the headline said it all: "Minas triggers fight against Jango." There was no turning back anymore. The coup was now officially in the streets.
Passagem do Destacamento Tiradentes pelo município de Areal (RJ).
Fundo Correio da Manhã/Arquivo Nacional